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2. Ownership and governance of
infrastructure networks
2.1 Brief history 
Communities’  infrastructure  networks  such  as  electricity,  heating,  water,  sew-
age, telecommunications and transport networks have traditionally been owned 
and operated by the public sector. These public goods have often been provided 
through taxes, even though pay schemes that exclude non-payers would have 
been technically feasible. Free services have been provided because of a belief 
that denying public services to non-payers would be denial of rights (Jacobson & 
Tarr 1995). Current economic theories, however, argue that many public utilities 
and services can be delivered more efficiently when private sector is involved or 
when the entity delivering the service is corporatized or privatized. The private 
sector is said to bring stronger managerial capacity, access to new technology, 
specialized skills and more flexible and rapid response to changes in the world 
markets (Rondinelli 2003). Also opposite opinions have been presented that, in 
certain circumstances, public ownership or public-private partnerships would be 
more efficient. 
The rise of the public ownership took place at the beginning of the 20th centu-
ry. Economics supported government ownership if any market inequities or im-
perfections such as monopoly power or externalities were present (Shleifer 
1998). It was believed that government could protect the companies from the 
power of the market and secure the post-war service provision of socially im-
portant commodities (Taylor 2006, Perotti 2004). These ideas lasted for several 
decades until the ideas of economic transformation at the end of the 1970s. Pro-
tection, rent-seeking and customs barriers gave way to (regulated) profit maxi-
mization and efficiency acquired through private sector involvement. 
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The wave of privatization started in the early 1980s with the UK government 
taking the lead under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Privatization spread 
rapidly worldwide. In many countries previously nationalized infrastructure 
networks were sold to private ownership. However, privatization experienced 
difficulties during and after the process, such as increased prices, self-serving 
management, deterioration of quality of the product or service or both, and other 
nuisances. It was realized that, in absence of good regulatory framework, privat-
ization does not always lead to lower costs, better quality or more efficient pro-
duction because, from the public viewpoint, of the private sector objectives did 
not coincide with those of the public. Privatization processes are still going on in 
some developing countries, but in the industrialized world it has declined a little. 
In the latter countries, private sector involvement is being used in different ways 
when emerging economic theories and financing instruments suggest that meth-
ods such as corporatization of public entities, public private partnerships (PPP), 
or other market-oriented mechanisms might offer higher and sustainable benefits 
in the provision of public services. 
Public private partnerships started to gain ground in the 1990s when the nega-
tive consequences of the privatization processes became clearer and when it was 
understood that purely public provision is not efficient either. The partial inclu-
sion of the private sector in projects and in the provision of public services gives 
the advantages of the strengths of both the public and the private sectors. Private 
sector is thought to effect more competitive and economically efficient opera-
tions while the public sector emphasizes more social responsibility and account-
ability. Figure 1 shows the ownership and governance reforms. 
Figure 1. Reforms and development of ownership. 
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Politics has always influenced public service provision. This is also true in to-
day’s Finland. Infrastructure development, kinds of public goods demanded, and 
the roles played by private firms have over the years been shaped by politically 
important actors and the workings of government, political, and legal institu-
tions. The same holds true also abroad; in the US, for example, regulatory, fran-
chising and contracting arrangements have been influenced by the opinions of 
how “public” the various goods and services are. When the service has been 
seen as predominantly “private”, the private service provider is makes decisions 
about price, output and quality of the service. When the service instead has been 
seen  as  public,  these  decisions  have  had  to  be  made,  or  at  least  regulated,  by  
government agencies, regardless of the role played by the private sector (Jacob-
son & Tarr 1995). 
2.2 Definitions 
Ownership has four attributes (Olsson 1999, Alchian & Demsetz 1973, Alchian 
1993): (i) the right to decide how the property is used; (ii) the right to benefit 
and earn income from the asset’s use or lease; (iii) the right/obligation to bear 
the consequences if the net value of the property changes; and (iv) the right to 
sell, give up or exchange the property and exclude others from using it. 
Transferability of property rights enables the separation and specialization of 
ownership and control, that is, the separation of the ownership from manage-
ment.3 Although this can bring benefits, it also introduces the principal-agent 
problem: will the agent (the management) pursue the principal’s (the owner’s) 
objectives under asymmetric information and diverging interests. In order to 
align the interest of the principal and the agent, the latter’s compensation con-
tracts must on one hand have fair risk-sharing properties, and on the other hand 
the Board of Directors need to have the powers to represent the interests of the 
principals and exercise appropriate control over the operations. The principal-
agent problem is dealt with by means of corporate governance. 
3 There are, in fact, normally four actors involved in infrastructure services: the owner (normally 
the state or municipality); the administration (which makes or procures the plans to effect the 
owner’s policies); the manager (which supervises or controls that the plans and services are car-
ried out as specified); and the supplier/operator (which designs, builds, maintains and operates 
the infrastructure services). These are explained more thoroughly later in the text. 
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The definition of corporate governance is taken from Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD): “Corporate governance is the 
system by which companies are directed and controlled, in the interest of share-
holders and other stakeholders, to sustain and enhance value.” OECD has pro-
posed a ‘menu’ of good governance for external and internal control mecha-
nisms that motivate corporate executives to make decisions that enhance the 
firm’s value to its stakeholders. 
Good governance essentially means: 
 focusing on the organization’s purpose and on outcomes for citizens 
and service users 
 performing effectively in clearly defined functions and roles 
 promoting values for the whole organization and demonstrating the 
values of good governance through appropriate behavior 
 taking informed, transparent decisions and managing risk 
 developing the capacity and capability of the governing body (Board) 
to be effective 
 engaging stakeholders and making accountability real. 
Appendix D details the OECD ‘menu’ for good governance in state-owned en-
terprises  (SOE)  and  companies  (SOC).  These  are  well-observed  in  most  SOEs  
and SOCs in Finland. However, in municipally owned enterprises (MOE) and 
companies (MOC) the experience is mixed, in fact their characteristics fall far 
short of several of the ‘menu’s requirements. 
Governance is especially important when the ownership and control are sepa-
rated,  as  they  should  be  in  SOEs  and  MOEs.  When  the  ownership  is  divided  
between many parties, as is sometimes the case in Finland, or when the owners 
do  not  “run”  the  company,  as  is  also  the  case  in  many  Finnish  SOCs,  SOEs,  
MOEs and MOCs, but have a management team in charge of daily operations of 
the company, corporate governance is of central importance. Governance is im-
portant even when the owners’ employees operate the infrastructure networks as 
is the case for most infrastructure networks in Finland, which are operated by a 
department in the municipal administration or a state entity. The role of the 
Board of Directors to ratify and monitor important decisions and to avoid collu-
sion between owners and management of the control agents is a difficult issue in 
state or municipality-owned entities. 
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The OECD ‘menu’ addresses these issues (see Appendix D). Briefly, good 
corporate governance requires the creation and establishment of institutions and 
mechanisms, which can reduce the transaction costs arising from the separation 
of ownership and control. Governance is about information sharing and trust 
between owners and administrators and managers so that the owners can not 
only have confidence but can also monitor and verify that the management 
makes reasonable decisions from the owner’s viewpoint. 
The choice of ownership form, control (Board) and operation (administration 
and management), the Board mediating between the other two, defines the gov-
ernance framework and, ultimately, the performance and efficiency of the enter-
prise and its operation (Figure 2). This governance framework is also determined 
in relation to decentralization, outsourcing, commercialization, corporatization 
or privatization and public-private partnerships as discussed later. Note that the 
governance framework encompasses also ownership, although in the sequel, for 
clarity, ownership is often viewed as an independent choice. 
Figure 2. Ownership, control, operation and governance. 
2.3 Situation in Finland 
Most of the infrastructure networks in Finland are publicly owned and the pri-
vatization movement has not advanced at the same pace as in several other coun-
tries. Technical infrastructure networks are typically owned, administered and 
managed by the public sector as they are considered public goods and critical 
infrastructure by the state and the municipalities. However, the public sector is 
beginning to adopt the business entrepreneurial practices in the form of Munici-
pality-Owned Enterprises (MOEs) and Companies (MOCs). 
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The private ownership models that were observed during the course of the re-
search were for the private road and waterworks co-operatives and (two) private 
ports. The range of variations is from the public departments which deliver all 
services by public employees to the purely private. Most of this report deals with 
infrastructure under public ownership. 
There are important differences between public companies and public enterpris-
es. Importantly, the public enterprises cannot go bankrupt, they do not have to pay 
VAT and other taxes, and often – even after the EU SOE decision – they are in 
some places competing with entities organized as companies. When contrasted 
with the OECD guidelines for the SOE, the MOEs fall short on many dimensions, 
as reviewed in Appendix D. It also is necessary to make a distinction between 
Client MOE/SOEs and Supplier MOE/SOEs. The former procure services or prod-
ucts, either by negotiation or competitively, and the latter supply the services or 
products the clients have procured either through competition or direct negotiations. 
Many waterworks, ports, energy and the airports are already public enterprises 
(MOE/SOE)  or  companies  (MOC/SOC).  This  may  be  due  to  their  customers  
paying directly for the services or products they use, these revenues cover (most 
of) the expenditures. In the municipalities, the road and street users are not pay-
ing directly for their use, but funds are provided from the general budget, which 
presents a management challenge for the municipality’s technical directors. At 
the state level, the road and waterways users pay special taxes and fees for road 
or  seaway  use;  these  revenues  accrue  to  the  state  as  general  tax  revenue.  The  
taxes and fees collected from the road users more than cover the expenditures on 
the roads (Leviäkangas & Talvitie 2004); but fall slightly short for seaways. Of 
course, for both roads and seaways, there are regional variations in the cost re-
covery. The railway users pay for rail service operator, VR, for service, although 
the publicly owned infrastructure cost is mostly covered through state budget. 
For roads and railways the taxpayers do pay for the infrastructure, but until 2009 
in road sector the special fuel tax was levied on the road users only, however the 
tax was not ear-marked for road infrastructure costs; in the railway the majority 
of  infrastructure  costs  is  covered  by  direct  state  budget  transfers,  with  only  a  
fraction recovered from user charges through VR. These two sectors provide an 
incomplete picture of the sector financing when assessed only through revenues 
collected. 
From 2009 onwards, the road traffic has been subjected to carbon-based taxation. 
This  resulted in a  decrease in the cost  recovery of  the sector  as  far  as  public  state  
roads are concerned, but still covered all the costs (Leviäkangas & Hautala 2011). 
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The state has been more active than the municipalities in restructuring the in-
frastructure networks. The main motivation or logic is that the state has been 
more intent to restructure in order to reduce the national budget expenditures for 
infrastructure administration and management. Some restructuring is also taking 
place in the municipalities as several small to mid-sized municipalities have 
adopted the (true) client-supplier model, explained in the next chapter. Even in a 
few of the larger cities there are MOEs both in the client and supplier side. Re-
structuring does not necessarily lead to converge towards privatization or private 
service provision. What is more important is to strive for efficiency gains 
through restructuring measures. Several challenges exist, preventing the munici-
palities becoming good stewards of infrastructure networks. The challenges in-
clude how to keep or return the assets in good condition, how to obtain good 
knowledge of asset conditions and accurate cost information about asset mainte-
nance, and how to procure the supplier services competitively from the market. 
Governance correlates with ownership and includes a hierarchal structure, 
which has a systematic approval process where issues, budgets, management and 
administration, and others pressing issues are decided. Various types of boards 
and committees are the mainline structure, while the technical network agencies 
and departments run the day-to-day operations and management of the infra-
structure networks. The governance structures between the state and municipalities 
are quite similar, but change when different models are used. Figure 3 shows the 
different of governance arrangements for both the state and municipal levels. 
Figure 3. Typical governance structure. 
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C-Business project has examined several types of governance models for infra-
structure networks, both at the state and the municipal level. The actors involved 
in all infrastructure sectors include: 
 Owner defines the legal and organization framework, policies, goals, 
and  funding.  In  Finland  there  are  three  kinds  of  owners:  the  state,  the  
municipalities, and private companies and cooperatives. 
 Administrator ensures that  the policies,  goals,  and political  aims of  the 
owner are fulfilled For example, in Finland, the administrator for the na-
tional roads is the Finnish Transport Agency, aided by the ELY Regional 
offices; in the municipalities the administrator is usually the city’s tech-
nical department 
 Manager specifies the activities in detail, procures, supervises, and mon-
itors the works. In the road sector, the manager is ELY regional office 
for the state (ELY = Centre for Economic Development, Transport and 
the Environment); in the municipalities the technical department, or a 
municipal enterprise or company; the manager can also be a private sec-
tor “operator” of the services; in a few cases the manager tasks are out-
sourced to a consultant, or a design-build contractor. 
Typically, in most cases, the administrator and the manager combine the tasks of 
the Client Services.
 Supplier is the entity that supplies the services for studies, design, con-
struction, maintenance, and operation of services; these can be the same 
of different entities or companies. 
 In Finland, the supplier can be the technical department’s labor (“own 
workers”), or a private sector company, or a combination of these two. 
In cases where the supplier and the manager roles are combined and out-
sourced, the Client is the administrator. 
The modern trend is that the manager and the supplier are from the private sector. 
The  administrator  can  be  a  civil  service  or  private  sector  entity.  In  some  cases  
the administrator and manager duties or the manager and supplier duties are 
combined. The practice in which the Client procures the services and the private 
sector supplies them is called the (true) Client-Supplier Model.
In the following chapter the classification of typical ownership and govern-
ance models is described. 
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2.4 Classification 
There are at present 336 (in 2011) municipalities in Finland and each of them 
has its own tailor-made approach to governance of infrastructure networks. The-
se variations in the approach are classified to six basic models (Figure 4) to fit 
the circumstances and administrative and political context in the municipalities. 
In spite of the lack of standardization and common practices the six governance 
models cover the existing practices surprisingly well. The recent mergers and 
cooperative efforts require some homogenization of practices. The merging of 
practices has been deliberate and slow and even impractical in some cases. Thus, 
in sum, the observation during their research was that, despite of the diversity of 
arrangements, issues and characteristics in each sector can be classified into a 
few models. 
On the basis of case studies, the ownership and governance models can be 
categorized into six models: 
 Traditional model: Work is carried out for the most part by the own la-
bor force, often with some degree of outsourcing. 
 Municipality- or State-Owned Enterprise model: MOE or  SOE can  
be either the client or supplier part of an organization; legislation is used 
to establish business or entrepreneurial entities and practices with the 
objective of self-sustaining cost recovery. MOE/SOE does not pay taxes. 
There are three variants: 
o Client MOE or SOE 
o Supplier MOE or SOE 
o Integrated MOE (Co-ownership or merger of several municipalities) 
 (True) Client-supplier model: All the services are procured in the 
market, such as design, construction, maintenance and other services. 
Procurement is done in competitive market without negotiated contracts. 
 Municipality- or State-Owned Company model: MOC or SOC can be 
either the client or supplier part of organization. These entities, legally es-
tablished, are self-supporting and pay full corporate and value added taxes. 
o Client MOC and SOC 
o Supplier MOC and SOC 
o Integrated MOC (Co-ownership or merger of several municipalities). 
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 PPP model: The client (municipality or state) and a private contractor 
enter into a legally organized partnership, hence the name Public Private 
Partnership (PPP). In Finland, Mikkeli is the only example of a PPP 
model. Mikkeli retains a certain percentage share and the contract winner 
has the remaining share of the partnership. This means that the rewards 
and risks are shared.
 Private Cooperative or Association: This  is  an  entity  formed  by  a  
group of autonomous persons to meet certain service needs of its mem-
bers. A cooperative is owned by its members, who usually are the cus-
tomers of the service. Both the road and water sectors have a private co-
operative model. The road cooperative model can receive government 
grants for capital expenditures. Many municipalities provide financial 
support for maintenance of private road associations as a service to the 
residents in the community. 
Using this classification the ownership and governance models are illustrated in 
Figure 4. 
Figure 4. Typical ownership and governance models. 
2. Ownership and governance of infrastructure networks 
37
The ownership model can also be looked at from governance vantage point as 
shown in Figure 5. It shows the various governance forms, public and private. 
The state ownership structure would be equivalent to the municipal figure. The 
(true) client-supplier model and the PPP model are not shown as they do not 
match this particular style of private or public ownership shown in Figure 5.  
Figure 5. Ownership from governance point of view. 
2.5 Variations in ownership and governance structures 
2.5.1 Management variations 
The debate continues over public or private ownership. Both extremes, a public 
or a private monopoly are not considered effective. However, a private monopoly, 
unless well-regulated, is perceived by many to be worse as public values and 
quality can be displaced by monopoly pricing, and service provision at the lowest 
possible cost. A cooperative approach between the public and private might be a 
worthy approach to achieve a proper balance. More recently, with diminishing 
public resources and downsizing trends, it has become difficult for a government 
entity to deliver all the services the infrastructure networks provide, and private 
2. Ownership and governance of infrastructure networks 
38
participation may be a welcomed strategy. But, even under diminishing budgets 
there is a need to consider and seek other alternatives than the simple strategy of 
elimination of all or most public jobs. 
Most of the municipal infrastructure networks are administered and managed
through public agencies, departments or technical centres, which are termed the 
client organization (excludes co-operatives). The supplier organization does the 
physical works, services and operations, which can be performed by own labor 
force or outsourced from the private market. In the cases where there are MOCs 
and SOCs, the services may be performed by vertically integrated sister compa-
nies. There are small municipalities, Askola, Inkoo, Varkaus and some others 
that have totally disvested their own direct labor force for the infrastructure net-
works. Also the Finnish Transport Agency (FTA) is a client organization and has 
and owns no direct labor force to supply services (a client-supplier model). The 
VR Group owns a railway supplier company VR-Rata. Finavia also owns sister 
companies, but their services are procured competitively and also offered to 
other clients. 
The administrative services are performed by the municipality staff. There are 
many variations and idiosyncrasies. In the traditional model the following deci-
sions are made: (i) which organization does the planning and approvals; (ii) will 
the design services be carried out by own labor force, or will it be outsourced; 
(iii) what percentage of the civil or other works will be done by own labor; (iv) 
who performs the outsourcing for the services; (v) and how the personnel are 
arranged within the organization itself. The established monopolies have flexi-
bility to choose between direct labor force and procurement from the market. An 
interesting variation is in the Kiiminki road sector where the outsourcing of ser-
vices is actually performed by the supplier organization and not the client. 
It is typical in the MOEs/MOCs structure that the client negotiates contracts 
with the supplier MOEs/MOCs, instead of procuring the services using competi-
tion, as in the (true) client-supplier model. This is an artificial exercise since the 
supplier’s  direct  labor  force  is  retained  as  first  priority.  This  practice  was  ob-
served in all road/street supplier MOEs/MOCs; their contracts were always ne-
gotiated, for both capital and maintenance projects. This is a weakness of the 
model. In the (true) client-supplier model all services are not negotiated, but 
procured through open public tendering. The core functions with the client or-
ganization can vary, but procurement is permanent – and important. 
Some of the publicly owned enterprises and corporatized companies have cor-
poratized subsidiaries (sister companies) that supply services for management, 
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operations, and civil works. These are sometimes referred to as vertically inte-
grated companies. This corporate style structure was observed for the state rail 
network operator, some water networks, airports, energy production and trans-
mission, and ports. For the most part, these types of public ownership models are 
employing corporate entrepreneurial practices. 
In MOCs/SOCs there are also other variations. How much profit is returned to 
the owners; whether there are corporate subsidiaries; whether international com-
petition or ventures into other business opportunities are allowed; and whether 
there is single or shared ownership (municipal mergers). 
Asset management and ICT systems, and asset management tools are needed 
to determine the activities and their timing. This practice varied greatly; most 
municipalities did not have asset management systems at all. This was correlated 
with the municipality’s size and with the ownership model. Larger municipalities 
do have some type of asset management systems, while the smaller ones rely on 
local knowledge of experienced staff. 
Even though the ownership may have been restructured, there is very little 
private management of the infrastructure networks. This is an interesting finding 
since private management operators are quite popular, especially for waterworks 
in England and the USA. In Finland, private sector participation in the manage-
ment  services  was  only  used  in  some  recent  cases.  Askola  roads  use  a  private  
firm to manage, operate and provide the services it needs. FTA uses private 
firms to manage some isolated projects. These one-off cases show that there are 
options available for private participation from management to service delivery, 
including the PPP model. 
2.5.2 Service variations 
The tasks performed by the client and supplier units vary between governance 
models. The services vary with the level of expertise available in the municipality. 
If the (“in-house”) direct labor force has competence, the services are provided 
with own labor force up to its capacity. In the case where market does not exist 
within the municipality, services can be procured from surrounding municipali-
ties’ direct labor force through a cooperation approach or, when direct labor 
capacity is exhausted, directly from private market. A good example, in some 
municipalities, is the resurfacing of streets and roads where there is a framework 
agreement with surrounding municipalities to use the in-house staff or labor first 
up to its capacity (this is irrespective of the governance model). 
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Helsinki represents a traditional model where both the client and the supplier 
are organized as municipal units (separated from each other). The City Engi-
neer’s office (Rakennusvirasto) acts as the client and city’s own supplier organi-
zation, Stara, builds and maintains streets, parks and other infrastructure, reno-
vates city-owned buildings and provides logistical services. In Oulu, the client 
organization of the municipality (organized as a unit) procures most of the con-
struction and maintenance of streets, water, and recreational areas from TEKLI, 
the supplier MOE of the city. 
In the case of Lahti Aqua Oy, the parent company Lahti Aqua is responsible 
for  water  and  sewage  services  and  their  development,  administration  and  cus-
tomer service. Subsidiary Aqua Services Oy provides operational and mainte-
nance services and subsidiary Aqua Networks Oy owns the pipelines and facili-
ties, and commission and finance investments. Lahti Aqua procures for example 
construction services also from private companies. 
2.5.3 Mergers, cooperation & others 
One common trend that was observed with municipalities is the formation of 
joint municipal authorities that are taking advantage of economies of scale and 
scope by having one joint entity to provide the services for all participating mu-
nicipalities. There have also been several recent mergers of municipalities into 
one larger municipality with the same result. In addition, short of a merger of 
municipalities, is the merger of individual infrastructure networks, such as wa-
terworks around Helsinki, Lahti, Turku and Hämeenlinna with the big city as the 
anchor. In Helsinki region the waterworks, organized as a Federation of Munici-
palities (FoM), resembles a MOE with some MOC features. Waterworks in Lahti, 
Turku and Hämeenlinna are organized as MOCs. 
The Helsinki Region Environmental Services Authority (HSY), organized as a 
FoM, provides waste management and water and sewage services in Espoo, 
Helsinki, Kauniainen and Vantaa. Although HSY provides also other services, 
water and sewage services have a profit and loss statement and balance sheet 
separate from other HSY services. HSY does all four core services (water acqui-
sition and treatment, water delivery, sewage collection and sewage treatment) 
and maintenance with direct labor. Some smaller construction work can also be 
done with the direct labor, but most construction is outsourced. An interesting 
aspect in HSY governance is that the general (shareholder) meeting of the feder-
ation elects the members of the Board of Directors in relation to political power 
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for the duration of the municipal election cycle. This would not be possible in a 
MOC and this might be one reason why the municipalities in the Helsinki met-
ropolitan area chose to establish a federation instead of a MOC. 
One example of cooperation is the concession agreement between Lahti Aqua 
Oy and the municipality of Hollola. The 15 year concession agreement covers all 
water and sewage services in Hollola so that the municipality of Hollola owns 
the facilities and networks and Lahti Aqua Services Oy provides services with 
Hollola’s equipment. This is the first model in Finland, where the waterworks 
takes a financial risk to provide certain service level to neighbouring municipali-
ty with a fixed price. 
Some other merged entities apply the traditional model; in Seinäjoki the 
merged entity is predominantly using the traditional model with direct labor 
force and outsourcing only services to selected remote areas. The technical net-
work in Kerava is a unique model in which six different departments are merged 
into one client MOE. Six departments are consolidated into one in order to ob-
tain economies of scale and scope. This represents another kind attempt to im-
prove efficiency and effectiveness. 
2.5.4 Evolution of governance models 
Concurrently with the interviews and the development of governance classifica-
tion reference was made to previous research on the evolution of ownership and 
governance typologies (Talvitie 1996, Robinson 1999, Dunlop 1999). Although 
there were variations from municipality to municipality, it appeared that it was 
possible to classify the governance models into five distinct classes based on the 
separation of client and supplier functions. 
Most public authorities began as an in-house organization (traditional organi-
zation, Phase 1 in Figure 6). In many, especially larger, municipalities this has 
evolved through the identification (Phase 2) and separation of the client and 
supplier functions and roles (Phase 3) into corporatization of the producer (Phases 
4a–c). In the initial phases of the client and supplier separation negotiated con-
tracts are common between the client and supplier entities (Phases 2–4b). A 
culmination point is the pure client-supplier organization (Phase 4c) where all 
procurement is done competitively and all the suppliers are either privately or 
publicly owned companies operating under the same commercial laws. From 
Phase 5 forward the supply organization is fully privatized and is just another 
company amongst many that provide products and services for the customers. 
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The subsequent phases (Phases 6–7) indicate corporatization or privatization of 
the client, which in Finland has happened only in a handful of cities4.
Figure 6. Stages in reform. 
In ports sector the World Bank has provided a selection of managements models 
broadly applied globally.The World Bank port reform toolkit (World Bank 
2007) outlined four port administration models and assessed the strengths and 
weaknesses of each model. The ownership-governance model adopted in coun-
tries is influenced by the way the ports are organized, structured, and managed. 
The models outlined in the tool kit are the Service Port, the Tool Port, the Land-
lord Port, and the Private Service Port. These models differ by how the services 
are provided by public sector, private sector or mixed ownership providers; their 
orientation (local, regional or global); who owns the superstructure and capital 
equipment; and who provides dock labor and management. 
Service port model is one predominately public model in which the Port Au-
thority, a government entity, owns the land and all port assets (fixed and mobile) 
and performs regulatory and port functions. All cargo-handling operations are 
performed by direct labor of the Port Authority. This model is used in many 
developing countries. The Chairman of the Port Authority is (usually) a civil 
servant responsible for port administration, and reports directly to the Minister. 
In some cases, cargo-handling services are performed by a different public entity; 
this division of operations between public entities can present unique management 
challenges. Under this model, the same organization has the responsibility for 
performing regulatory functions, developing infrastructure and superstructure, 
4 Although privatization is here described as Phase 7 it is certainly not the end result of all reform 
activities. The project group does not recommend privatization of infrastructure that is 
necessary to the society. 
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and executing operational activities. Generally there is an absence of private 
sector involvement in port activities. The strength of this model lies in the fact 
that facilities development and operation are the responsibility of only one entity, 
allowing for a streamlined and cohesive approach to growth. On the other hand, 
the dearth of competition can lead to inefficiencies in port administration, to a 
lack of innovation, and services that are not user or market oriented. Dependence 
on government for funding may lead to wasteful use of resources or under-
investment. 
Tool port model is characterized by divided operational responsibilities. The 
Port Authority owns, develops, and maintains the port infrastructure and super-
structure; including cargo handling equipment such as quay cranes, forklift 
trucks etc. The operation of Port Authority equipment is usually performed by 
Port Authority labor, but other operations are performed by private cargo-
handling firms, on board vessels as well as on the quay and apron. The private 
operators are usually small companies. While the model results in an avoidance 
of duplication of facilities because investment in infrastructure and equipment is 
provided by the public sector, the fragmentation in responsibility for cargo-
handling can lead to conflicts between small operators and between the stevedoring 
companies and port administrators. Another weakness of the model is that there 
is a risk of under-investment. Strong stevedoring companies are not developed to 
benefit the local economy. 
In the Landlord port model, the Port Authority maintains ownership in the 
port while the infrastructure is leased to private operating companies. The re-
sponsibilities of the Port Authority as a landlord include economic development, 
long-term land development, and maintenance of basic port infrastructure like 
access roads, berths, and wharves. The private operating companies that lease 
from the Port Authority provide and maintain their own superstructure and pur-
chase and install their own equipment. Dock labor is also employed by the pri-
vate leasing companies. The strength of this model is that the same entity both 
executes operations and owns the cargo-handling equipment; therefore, the exe-
cuted plans are likely to result in better outcomes and be more likely greater 
responsiveness to changing market conditions. However, there is a risk of over-
capacity as more than one private operator may pressure for expansion. Also, 
there may be duplication of marketing effort as both the terminal operators and 
the port authority visit potential customers; therefore greater co-ordination of 
marketing and planning is required with this model. 
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In the Private (service) port model, the public sector no longer has interest in 
port activities. Port land is owned by the private sector. All regulatory functions 
and operational activities are performed by private companies. This is the model 
used in many ports in the United Kingdom. This model often results in flexible 
investments in port operations. A particular strength of the model is that port 
development and tariff policies are market oriented. On the other hand, this type 
of model may result in monopolistic behavior as well as a loss of public in-
volvement in developing long-term economic policy and strategies. Figure 7 
shows the traditional port management models. 
Type Infrastructure Superstructure Port Labor Other functions 
Public service port Public Public Public Majority public 
Tool port Public Public Private Public/private 
Landlord port Public Private Private Public/private 
Private service port Private Private Private Majority public 
Figure 7. Port management models according to World Bank Tool Kit (World Bank 2007). 
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